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Abstract
This study attempts to comprehensively explain economic growth
and stagnation in advanced and developing countries by endogenizing
educational efficiency, the critical exogenous parameter in the Uzawa-
Lucas model. In particular, we examine the dynamic properties of
educational efficiency given its substantial role in yielding a long-run
growth rate. The model yields multiple steady states under an in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity that is greater than 1. The results
reveal that a steady state with a higher growth rate shows indeter-
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expectations are formulated. Thus, realizing long-run growth with a
higher growth rate can be difficult owing to expectation formulations.
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1 Introduction
This study attempts to develop a simple extension of the Uzawa-Lucas model
(Uzawa 1965, Lucas 1988) and to provide an explanation for positive growth,
no growth, and the multiplicity of economic paths. Economic growth theory
focuses on realizing long-term growth and considers human capital as one of
the key inputs for such growth. Given its simplicity and convenience, the
Uzawa-Lucas model has been analyzed by introducing certain externalities;
for example, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), Benhabib and Rerli (1994),
Xie (1994), and Gomez (2003, 2004). Although these externalities are typ-
ically introduced in the goods production sector, this study introduces the
externality in the human capital accumulation sector. This setup yields not
only an endogenously determined long-run growth factor but also a mul-
tiplicity of economic paths, which would explain the diversity of economic
paths that are described, for example, as the ”mystery of economic growth”
in Lucas (1988), which is a seminal paper on endogenous growth theory.
Furthermore, the present analysis of the multiplicity of economic paths
also sheds light on stagnations caused by large economic shocks and the
economic booms that precede the shocks. Of course, these phenomena are
understood as monetary ones, (see, for example, Kindeleberger (1978)); how-
ever, in the preceding expansionary term, we can observe TFP (total factor
productivity) growth (see, for example, Kunieda and Shibata (2012)). The
present study aims to replicate multiple economic paths, such as one with a
high growth-rate path with the property of local indeterminacy and one with
a low- or no-growth rate path with saddle point stability.
In the Uzawa–Lucas model, the exogenously given efficiency parameter
of human capital accumulation (i.e., the educational efficiency parameter),
and the linearity of human capital investment are critical determinants of the
long-run growth rate. By denoting the educational efficiency parameter by b,
the subjective discount parameter by ρ, and the intertemporal substitution
elasticity by 1/θ, we obtain the long-run growth rate as (1/θ)(b−ρ). Further-
more, if b > ρ, then this long-run growth is realized, and if b < ρ, no human
capital accumulation is experienced and the economy is stuck in a no-growth
trap. Thus, the realization of long-run growth is contingent on exogenously
given parameter restrictions in the normal Uzawa–Lucas model.1
By contrast, the present model assumes that the educational efficiency
parameter b is endogenously determined but the dynamics are exogenous for
economic agents. Therefore, we call this inserted mechanism, “educational
1In this case, Kuwahara (2013) is an exception, where an exogenous b is assumed, but
long-run growth both with and without human capital investment is generated from an
international knowledge spillover.
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externality,” and extend the Uzawa–Lucas framework by introducing the dy-
namics of educational externality efficiency. For simplification, we consider
educational efficiency as a function of the economic production level cap-
tured by physical capital endowment per human capital accumulation. As is
broadly recognized, education is an engine for economic development, which
implies that economic accumulation is generally accompanied by the educa-
tional system. Thus, it is natural for a household to regard the educational
environment as given rather than a private decision. Therefore, we can say
that we develop a Uzawa–Lucas model with the minimum and simplest rela-
tionship between educational efficiency level and economic growth to present
the interrelationship between the two.
The results are summarized as follows. Too large educational external-
ity makes economy explosive. The model contains multiple steady states
with intertemporal substitution elasticity over 12, and there is a no-growth
steady state in the case of lower educational efficiency and a higher subjective
discount rate. The selection between the two depends on expectation forma-
tion, although the steady state with a high growth rate shows indeterminacy
properties under a small externality. Thus, it can be considered that the
former corresponds to advanced economies because of more efficient educa-
tion and long-run positive growth, while the latter to developing economies
given the less efficient education level and absence of a growth steady state.
Therefore, the difficulties of maintaining high growth for advanced economies
and achieving positive growth or initiating the growth path for developing
economies are caused by expectation formation under indeterminacy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the steady states. Section 4 discusses the dynamics and stability of
the system. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Model with externality on educational efficiency
We assume a normal Uzawa–Lucas-type final goods production structure. It
is constructed using physical capital (per capita capital stock is denoted by
k) and human capital (per capita human capital stock is h) and is consumed
as consumption goods (per capita consumption is c) and invested by physical
capital (increment of per capita capital stock is k˙); the final goods market
2Note that intertemporal substitution elasticity larger than 1 is necessary to generate
multiplicity in the present study to generate multiplicity and this condition is supported
by some empirical studies, for example, Vissing-Jorgenson and Attanasio (2003).
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is competitive. The division rate of human capital in goods production is
denoted as u(∈ (0, 1]); therefore, that of human capital in education is 1−u.
The clearing condition of the final goods market provides the dynamic
equation of k as follows:
k˙(t) = Ak(t)α(u(t)h(t))1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
y(t)
−c(t), 0 < α < 1, (1)
where A(> 0) is the efficiency parameter of final goods production.
Human capital is assumed to be accumulated through the following equa-
tion:
h˙(t) = b(t)(1− u(t))h(t), b > 0, (2)
where b(t) is an efficiency parameter of human capital assumed to be a vari-
able and the dynamics are introduced later in the paper. Furthermore, we
assume that the household regards the dynamics as exogenously determined.
The representative household is assumed to have the following dynamical
objective function on utility maximization:
max
∫ ∞
0
c(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ e
−ρtdt, (3)
where c, θ(> 0), and ρ > 0 are per capita consumption, the constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) parameter, and subjective discount rate, respectively.
Note that the CRRA parameter corresponds to the reciprocal of intertempo-
ral substitution elasticity in this class of utility functions.
Considering the dynamics of b(t) as exogenous, the household maximizes
this subject to the budget constraint, and the optimal conditions in the
case of positive human capital investment, we call the ”Uzawa regime,” are
calculated as follows:
λ(t) = c(t)−θ, (4)
λ(t)(1− α)y(t)
u(t)
= µ(t)b(t)h(t), (5)
ρλ(t)− λ˙(t) = ∂H
∂k(t)
= λ(t)α
y(t)
k(t)
, (6)
ρµ(t)− µ˙(t) = ∂H
∂h(t)
= λ(t)(1− α)y(t)
h(t)
+ µ(t)b(t)(1− u(t)), (7)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ(t)k(t) = 0, and lim
t→∞
e−ρtµ(t)h(t) = 0, (8)
where λ and µ are the shadow prices of physical and human capital.
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Then, we derive the dynamical equations in the Uzawa regime. Using
(4), (5), (6), and (7), we derive the following equations:
ρ− λ˙(t)
λ(t)
= α
y(t)
k(t)
(
:= r(t)
)
, (9)
ρ− µ˙(t)
µ(t)
=
λ(t)
µ(t)
(1− α)y(t)
h(t)
+ b(t)(1− u(t)) = b(t), (10)
Eqs.(6) and (7), and therefore, Eqs.(9) and (10), respectively, denote the
optimal conditions for physical and human capital. r and b represent the
marginal rate of transformation of physical and human capital, and as shown
later, the growth rates of λ and µ and values of r and b are equated in the
steady states with positive human capital accumulation.
Combining (4) and (9) yields the following Euler equation:
c˙(t)
c(t)
=
1
θ
{
αAx(t)α−1u(t)1−α − ρ} = 1
θ
(r(t)− ρ), (11)
where x := k/h. Using (5), (9), and (10), we get
u˙(t)
u(t)
=
1
α
[
b(t)− r(t) + αx˙(t)
x(t)
− b˙(t)
b(t)
]
. (12)
Here, we introduce an assumption regarding the dynamics of b. For ed-
ucational externality, we assume that the human capital endowment has a
positive spillover on educational productivity, and thus, ∂b
∂h
> 0. Next, we
need the property in which the effects are stationary in the steady states,
and thus, additionally assume that the larger the economy, the smaller the
spillover. We also assume the scale of an economy is captured by the per
capita capital stock k, and thus, ∂b
∂k
< 0. Therefore, b is assumed as follows:
Assumption The dynamics of b negatively depends on x = k/h:
b(t) = b
(
x(t)
)
, b′(·) < 0.
Furthermore, we assume that the elasticity of b on x, denoted by ε(> 0),
is constant: ε := − b′(x)x
b(x)
= (const). Thus, we specify the form of b(x) as
follows: b(x) = b¯x(t)−ε, where b¯(> 0) is the total efficiency of human capital
accumulation and elasticity ε captures the externality intensity of k and h. A
larger ε means larger externality of human capital accumulation. Note that
the assumption ε = 0 makes the present model the normal Uzawa–Lucas
model.
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3 Steady states
First, we consider the steady state with positive human capital accumulation,
or the inner solution case, u∗ ∈ (0, 1). We call this case the “Uzawa regime.”
A balanced growth path in the Uzawa regime is the state in which k, h,
and c grow at a constant rate. In addition, u is constant and u ∈ (0, 1),
and therefore, x, q, and u are constant. We analyze the properties of steady
states using three variable sets {x∗, q∗, u∗}, where the index ∗ denotes the
value at the steady state.
(1) and (2) imply that g∗y = g
∗
k = g
∗
c = g
∗
h = b(x
∗)(1− u∗)(:= g∗) and (4)
and (5) imply −θg∗c = g∗µ = g∗λ. Therefore, by substituting g∗ = −(1/θ)g∗µ
into (10), we get
(1− u∗)b(x∗)θ = b(x∗)− ρ. (13)
This relationship provides two equations: one is an equilibrium relationship
between x and u and the other is the equilibrium growth rate. The former
can be immediately transformed from (13) and is given as
u∗ = 1− 1
θ
+
ρ
θb(x∗)
(:= Ψ(x∗)). (14)
Imposing the condition in a steady state (x˙ = 0 and u˙ = 0) on (12), we have
b(x∗) = αAx∗α−1u∗1−α. (15)
Solving (15) with respect to u∗, we obtain the following equation that shows
the relationship between x and u in a steady state:
u∗ =
(
b(x∗)
αA
) 1
1−α
x∗ (:= Φ(x∗)). (16)
The intersection of the two equations, Ψ and Φ, determines the equilibrium
value(s) of u∗ and x∗. Under the specification of b(x) = b¯x−ε, we have
u = Ψ(x) =
θ − 1
θ
+
ρ
θb¯
xε︸︷︷︸
:=Ψ¯(x)
, u = Φ(x) =
[
b¯
α A
] 1
1−α
x1−
ε
1−α ,
where Ψ¯ is the variable term of Ψ. These two functions have the following
properties: Ψ is an increasing function and Φ(0) = 0, but the gradient of
Φ depends on the externality level ε, and the sign of Ψ(0) depends on the
reciprocal of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution parameter θ.
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Because the intersection of Φ and Ψ is so diverse, it is enormous and diffusive
to observe all cases. Therefore, we make certain assumptions to confine the
cases to an appropriate degree for the purpose of this study. To understand
the shift from ε to Φ and Ψ, Fig. 1 is an ad referendum drawn under the
assumption θ < 1, and 1 − 1
θ
+ b¯
θρ
> 0. 3 Note that if ε → 0, the model is
reduced to the normal Uzawa–Lucas model, and θ−1
θ
+ b¯
θρ
> 0 is one of the
necessary conditions for the inner solution.
Next, we check the steady state with no human capital investment; there-
fore, there is no growth in the long run. We call this case the ”Solow
regime,” where all human capital is employed in the final goods produc-
tion sector; therefore, u(t) becomes constant u = 1. In this case, human
capital investment is not optimal for a household, and the model resembles
the Solow model. Substituting u = 1 into the Euler equation, we obtain
r∗∗ = αAx∗∗α−1 = ρ, and therefore, x∗∗ =
[
αA
ρ
] 1
1−α
, where ∗∗ denotes the
steady state value of the Solow regime. The difference between the Solow
model and Solow regime in this study is the existence of the non-profitable
condition for human capital investment. This phenomenon emerges when
the MRT of human capital is lower than that of physical capital; there-
fore, we have the following condition: b(x∗∗) < αAx∗∗α−1(= ρ), that is,
b¯ < ρ1−
ε
1−α (αA)
ε
1−α (:= ρ˜). From this, we obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 1-1
b¯
{
>
<
}
ρ˜⇔ Economy
{
does not have
has
}
the Steady State in the Solow Regime.
We might term a country with b¯ > ρ˜ as ”advanced country” and one with
b¯ < ρ˜ as ”developing country.” The domain that the Solow regime steady
state exists is depicted on b¯-ρ plain in Fig. 2. Similar to the normal Uzawa–
Lucas model, the educational efficiency parameter b¯ and subjective discount
rate ρ determine the no-growth steady state. Under a more intense exter-
nality, the upward-sloping relationship between the parameters is disturbed
and a small subjective discount and high educational efficiency yield poverty
traps. In addition, the production parameter also affects the condition of
no-growth traps. Higher parameters of production A and physical capital
α (higher α decreases human capital efficiency in production 1 − α) make
higher educational efficiency necessary for the existence of long-run positive
growth; these affects relatively disadvantage education.
3In the iinterval of ε ∈ (0, 1− α), Φ is always increasing.
7
To clear the relationship between the above condition and equations Ψ
and Ψ, we define x = Φ−1(u) and x = Ψ−1(u) as the inverse function of
u = Ψ(x) and u = Φ(x) and xφ := Φ
−1(1) = {b¯/(αA)} 1−1+α+ε and xψ :=
Ψ−1(1) = (b¯/ρ)1/ε. Then, we derive the following:{
xφ < x
∗∗ < xψ
xψ < (x
∗∗) < xφ
}
⇐⇒ b¯
{
<
>
}
ρ˜.
Next, we explore the steady state in the Uzawa regime. Here, we consider
two cases: one with the Solow regime and the other without.
Case I: Small externality case (ε ∈ (0, 1− α)) At first, we inquire the
case with small externality, specified as follows:4
0 < ε < ε¯ :=
1− α
2− α,
(
ε¯ ∈
(
0,
1
2
))
.
. The phase of steady states with b¯ > ρ˜ and ε ∈ (0, 1− α) is depicted on ρ-b¯
plane in Fig.3 (a).
To obtain the condition of steady states, we reconsider the ralation be-
tween Φ and Ψ from the viewpoint of u, thus we obtain the equation u =
Ψ(Φ−1(u)) which gives the euqilibrium, and this equation is transformed into
(L(u) :=)u+
1− θ
θ
=
1
θ
Ω
1
β+εu
ε
β+ε (:= R(u)),
where β := 1 − ε
ε¯
and Ω := ρ˜
b¯
. In the case discussed here, β > 0, Ω ∈ (0, 1)
and ε
β+ε
∈ (0, 1) respectively hold. We respectively define the LHS and RHS
of the above equation as L(u) and R(u). The graph of L(u) and R(u) are
given by Fig.4(a).
Lemma 1-2 Under the assumption θ ∈ (θ, 1), b¯ > ρ˜, and ε ∈ (0, ε¯), namely
high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, high educational efficiency, and
small educational externality, we always have multiple equilibria {E1, E2}
where both equilibria are related with long-run positive growth.
4The properties of the intersection of Ψ and Φ are changed by ε, the intense parameter
of externality, and the properties are divided by some thresholds such as ε¯ and 1−α(> ε¯).
For example, 1 − α is the threshold that the incline of Φ is change from increasing to
decreasing for the increment of ε. Then, the above assumption given in (R1) implies
that we focus on the case with small externality. To understand the implication of ε¯,
we check the gradient of these two lines. We can derive ε from the following equation:
ε¯ = arg
{
ε
∣∣∣( Ψ¯′(x)xΨ¯(x) =) ε = 1− ε1−α (= Φ′(x)xΦ(x) )} . Therefore, the ε¯ is the point where
Φ and Ψ has the same buckling, and ε > (<)ε¯ implies that for small (large) externality,
buckling of Φ is larger (smaller) than that of Ψ.
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Proof) Since L(0) > R(0) and L(1) > R(1), which are respectively pro-
vided by θ < 1 and b¯ > ρ˜, the case, in which L and R have two equilibrium
u∗1 and u
∗
2, is conditioned by L(u) > R(u) for ∃u ∈ (0, 1).
To show this, we define uˆ := arg
{
u|R′(u) = 1(= L′(u))}, namaely uˆ is
the point where the gradient of R is equaled to unity which is the gradient of
L, and L(uˆ) > R(uˆ) is to be proved. Since R′(uˆ) = 1 and R′(u) = ε
β+ε
R(u)
u
,
we have R(uˆ) = β+ε
ε
uˆ(:= Q(uˆ)). R(uˆ) = Q(uˆ) gives
uˆ =
(
ε
β + ε
)β+ε
β
(
1
θ
)β+ε
β
Ω
1
β
.
Substituting the uˆ derived here into the condition L(uˆ) > R(uˆ), we obtain
the condition uˆ > u, where u := ε
β
1−θ
θ
. uˆ is the intersection of Q(u) and
L(u). From the Fig.5(a), where uˆ and u are drawn on (1/θ)-u plane, we have
uˆ > u for (1/θ) > 1, namely, θ < 1, thus, R(uˆ) > L(uˆ). Thus, we have
u∗2 < u < uˆ < u
∗
1.
From the necessary condition uˆ < 1, we have θ > θ, where θ := ε
β+ε
Ω
1
β+ε (∈
(0, 1)). (Q.E.D)
It should be noted that u∗2 < u < uˆ < u
∗
1 also plays an important role in
the determination of stability, which is discussed in the Ch.4 in this paper.
Here, we change the condition b¯ > ρ˜ in the above lemma into b¯ < ρ˜, then
the equilibrium E1 is vanished and E0 alternatively emerges
5. The phase of
steady states are given in the Tab.1(b).
Case II: Middle externality Case (ε ∈ (ε¯, 1−α)) Next, we inquire the
case with middle externality. When we additionally adpot the assumptions;
θ > 1, and b¯ < ρ˜, we obtain the phase of steady states are depicted on ρ-b¯
plane in Fig.4 (b). In this case, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1-3 Under the assumption θ > 1, b¯ < ρ˜, and ε ∈ (ε¯, 1−α), namely
low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, low educational efficiency, and
relatively large educational externality, we obtain multiple equilibria {E0, E1, E2}
where both equilibria {E1, E2} are related with long-run positive growth, and
the equilibrium {E0} is related with no growth traps.
5It should be noted that E0 is always existing under b¯ < ρ˜.
9
Table 1: Equilibrium Set
(A) Case of b¯ > ρ˜
θ (a) 0 < ε < ε¯ (b) ε¯ < ε < 1− α (c) ε > 1− α
θ < 1 {E1, E2} no steady state {E3}
θ > 1 {E1} {E2} {E3}
(B) Case of b¯ < ρ˜
θ (d) 0 < ε < ε¯ (e) ε¯ < ε < 1− α (f) ε > 1− α
θ < 1 {E0, E2} {E0, E1} {E0}
θ > 1 {E0} {E0, E1, E2} {E0}
Proof) In this case, we obtain β < 1, Ω < 1, and ε
β+ε
> 1. Since L(0) >
R(0) and L(1) > R(1) hold in this case, the property that L and R have two
equilibrium u∗1 and u
∗
2 is conditioned by L(u) > R(u) for ∃u ∈ (0, 1).
In Case II, we also obtain the same threshold value uˆ and u¯, depicted in
Fig. 5(b), where
(
ε
β+ε
)β+ε
β
Ω
1
β > 1 is derived from ε
β+ε
> 1 and Ω
1
β > 1.
Thus, we also obtain u∗2 < u < uˆ < u
∗
1. (Q.E.D)
Here, we also change the condition b¯ < ρ˜ in the above lemma into b¯ > ρ˜,
then the equilibria E0 and E1 are vanished. The phase of steady states are
given in the Tab.1(a).
Case III: Large externality case (ε > 1 − α) The last case is the one
with large externality. In this case, the function Φ becomes decreasing, so
multiple steady states does not emerge. The pattern of steady states is
determined by only the condition b¯ > ρ˜ or b¯ < ρ˜. The obtained relsut is
given in Tab.1 in the colum of ε > 1−α, and depicted in Fig. 3 (c) and (d).
E3 denotes the equilibrium with positive human capital accumulation in the
Case III.
Finally, we check the TVC. From (8), we have ρ ≥ γ∗λ+γ∗k and ρ ≥ γ∗µ+γ∗h,
where γZ :=
Z˙
Z
. Since p = µ/λ and x = k/h are constant in steady states,
both conditions are satisfied if one condition is shown to hold. Substituting
γλ = −θγc = −θg∗ = −(b∗ − ρ) and g∗k = g∗ = b∗(1 − u∗) into ρ ≥ γ∗λ + γ∗k
yields b∗u∗ ≥ 0, threfore, the steady states in the Uzawa regime obtained
above always satisfy the TVC conditions.
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Note that in the no-externality case, ε = 0, the condition becomes the
same as that in the normal Uzawa–Lucas model. In the following section, we
analyze the stability of the obtained steady states.
One of results obtained here is that an developing country migiht have
more possibility for multiple steady states, which corresponds to the large
flucuation of growth dynamics of those countries. Note that intertemporal
substitution elasticity larger than 1 (CRRA parameter is smaller than 1)
is supported by some empirical studies, for example, Vissing-Jorgenson and
Attanasio (2003). Under this condition (θ < 1), advanced country with
ε¯ < ε < 1 − α, lose steady state, and as is given in Appendix, E3 is shown
to be source around ε = 1. These results imply that too large externality
diffuses economy, so hereafter, we confine our analysis mainly to the case
0 < ε < ε¯.
4 Dynamical system and stability
Because the case without human capital accumulation (which is related to
{E0}) is reduced to the standard Ramsey model, saddle stability is easy
to prove. Thus, we concentrate on the cases with positive long-run growth
(related to E1, E2).
4.1 Dynamical equations
Let us define the following variables:
w(t) := (1− α)Ax(t)1−αu(t)1−α, and p(t) := µ(t)
λ(t)
. (17)
Note that p corresponds to the stock price of human capital if the agents can
trade their ownership of human capital in the asset market.
From r (defined in (9)) and w in (17), we obtain the following two prop-
erties:
r(t)1−αw(t)α = α1−α(1− α)αA, and r(t)
w(t)
=
α
1− α
u(t)
x(t)
. (18)
On the other hand, substituting r and w in (18) yields
w(t)h(t) = b(t)p(t)h(t), namely w(t) = p˜(t). (19)
where p˜ := b p, which represents the efficiency-adjusted stock price of human
capital. Substituting (19) in (18), we have the interest rate as a function of
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p as follows:
r(t) = r(p˜(t)) := p˜(t)−
1−α
α , for ∀t, and r′(·) < 0. (20)
where the property r′(·) < 0 comes from the well-known Stolper–Samuelson
theorem. From (18)–(20), we obtain
u(t) =
1− α
α
r(p˜(t))
p˜(t)
x(t). (21)
Thus, u(t) is determined by p˜ and x. Next, we analyze the dynamical system
using the variable set {p˜(t), q(t), x(t)}.
Defining the new variable q := c/k, we rewrite the system constituted by
(1), (2), (11), and (21) as follows:
q˙(t)
q(t)
=
(
1
θ
− 1
α
)
r(p˜(t))− ρ
θ
+ q(t), (22)
x˙(t)
x(t)
=
[
1
α
+ υ
(
x(t), p˜(t)
)]
r(p˜(t))− q(t)− b(x(t)). (23)
where υ(x, p˜) := 1−α
α
b(x)x
p˜
. Note that u∗ = υ∗ holds in the steady states with
positive human capital accumulation since r∗ = b∗ holds.
Using (9), (10) with the definition of p˜(= b µ/λ), and specification of
b(x)(= b¯x−ε), the dynamics of p˜ are given as
˙˜p(t)
p˜(t)
=
b˙(t)
b(t)
+
µ˙(t)
µ(t)
− λ˙(t)
λ(t)
= r(p˜(t))− b(x(t))− εx˙(t)
x(t)
,
=
{
1− ε
[
1
α
+ υ(x(t), p˜(t))
]}
r
(
p˜(t)
)
+ ε q(t)− (1− ε)b(x(t)). (24)
The three dynamical equations, (22), (23), and (24), constitute the economic
system of the model.
4.2 Stability analysis
In this section, we discuss the dynamics of the model. From Eqs. (22)–(24),
we obtain the linearized dynamical equations { ˙˜p, q˙, x˙} as follows: ˙˜p(t)q˙(t)
x˙(t)
 =J∗
 p˜(t)− p˜∗q(t)− q∗
x(t)− x∗
 ,
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where
J∗ :=
 u∗αx∗ [−α+ ε (1 + αu∗1−α)] p˜∗ εp˜∗ (1− ε) εb(x∗)x∗ (1− u∗)p˜∗(1− α
θ
)
u∗
αx∗ q
∗ q∗ 0
−u∗
α
(
1 + αu
∗
1−α
) −x∗ b(x∗)[(1− ε)u∗ + ε]
 .
The stability around the steady state depends on the sign of the eigenvalues
derived from the above linearized system. To investigate the sign of the
values, we define the following characteristic equation for the above system:
Γ(λ) = −λ3 + Tr∗λ2 +B∗λ+Det∗,
where λ, Tr∗, and Det∗, respectively, denote the eigenvalue, trace, and de-
terminant of this system. Then, B∗ is derived as follows:
B∗ = −u∗
[
q∗b∗ +
p˜∗
x∗
(q∗ − b∗u∗)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=B¯
+ ε
[
2
b∗p˜∗u∗
αx∗
(
1 +
αu∗
1− α
)
− p˜
∗q∗u∗
αx∗
(
1− α
θ
)
+ b∗q∗(1− u∗)
]
.
From J∗ and using q∗ = r(p˜
∗)
α
[1+(1−α) b(x)x∗
p˜∗ ]+ b(x
∗), we have Tr∗ and Det∗
as follows:
Det∗ =b(x∗)p˜∗q∗
u∗
x∗
[
−{(1− ε)u∗ + ε}+ ε(1
θ
+
u∗
1− α
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Θ
Tr∗ =
r(p˜∗)
α
[
(1− α)
(
1 +
b(x∗)
p˜∗
)
+ ε
(
1 +
αu∗
1− α
)]
+ b(x∗)
{
(1− ε)u∗ + ε} > 0.
Therefore, the sign of Θ affects the dynamical properties through the sign of
the determinant.
Lemma 2-1 E1 is saddle stable and E2 is the source or indeterminacy.
Proof) From the Routh–Hurwitz theorem (see, for example, Benhabib
and Perli (1994) and Arnold (2000)), Det∗ < 0(> 0) and Tr∗ > 0 imply
the set of eigenvalues {++−} ({+++} or {+−−}), and therefore, saddle
stability (source or indeterminacy). Thus, the dynamical properties in the
present case depend on the sign of Θ, which yields the condition
u∗
{
>
<
}
u⇔
{
saddle stable
source or indeterminacy
. (25)
Applying u∗2 < u < u
∗
1, which is derived in the proof of Lemma 1-2 to (27), we
have the result that E1 is saddle stable and E2 is the source or indeterminacy.
(Q.E.D)
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This lemma implies that u∗2 is related with Det > 0, that is, the indeter-
minacy or source. By inquiring the properties, we have the following result:
Lemma 2-2 The system converging u∗2 shows indeterminacy if ε is suffi-
ciently near 0.
Proof) Following the Routh–Hurwitz theorem, the indeterminacy or source
depends on the following condition:
−B∗ + Det
∗
Tr∗
{
>
<
}
0⇐⇒
{
indeterminacy
source
(26)
Since the sign of Det∗ and Tr∗ is positive in this case, if B∗ < 0 is satisfied,
the system shows indeterminacy. Note that B∗(ε) is the liner equation with
variable ε and the constant term B¯ := −u [qb+ p˜
x
(q − bu)]; therefore, if B¯ is
negative, B∗ < 0 holds for a sufficiently small ε. To hold B¯ < 0, it is sufficient
to hold q∗ − bu∗ > 0. (22) and r∗ = b∗ yield q = ρ
θ
− (1
θ
− 1
α
)
b and (13)
yields bu = b
(
1− 1
θ
)
+ ρ
θ
. Substituting these equations into q − bu, we have
q − bu = b ( 1
α−1
)
> 0; thus, we obtain the result that the system converging
u2 shows indeterminacy for a sufficiently small externality, ε.(Q.E.D)
Therefore, the case with both 0 < ε < ε¯ and the existence of E2, the steady
states yielded by E2 show indeterminacy for a sufficiently small externality.
Contrary to several previous studies6, sufficiently small, even negligible, ex-
ternality makes the appearance of indeterminacy possible. The countries with
high educational efficiency, which are supposed to be advanced economies,
might grow at high growth rates, but the formation of expectations makes it
difficult for the steady states to show indeterminacy properties.
Uniting the above explorations, we have the following result:
Proposition I Under the restriction b¯ > ρ˜, the economy with higher in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity (θ ∈ (θ, 1)) and educational externality
ε ∈ (0, ε¯) has multiple equilibria with a mid and high growth rate. The steady
state with mid-level growth (E1) is always saddle stable and that with a high
growth rate (E2) shows potential for indeterminacy if the economy has a suf-
ficiently small externality.
?
If countries have high educational efficiency, they are presumed to be ad-
vanced economies, and given their high intertemporal substitution elasticity,
6Roughly speaking, indeterminacy easily emerges under larger externalities, and there-
fore, studies in the literature have attempted to generate indeterminacy for smaller exter-
nalities (see, for example, Lucas (1988) and Benhabib and Perli (1994)).
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they are capable of achieving positive growth but not at high levels. However,
the dynamical properties related to high growth are indeterminant; thus, the
realization of positive growth is posed with difficulties from expectation for-
mation.
Proposition II Under the restrictions b¯ < ρ˜, the economy always has a
no-growth steady state (E0), and this steady state is saddle stable. The steady
state with a positive growth rate (E2) exists for θ ∈ (0, 1), and, at least, for
the sufficient small externality, the steady state E2 shows indeterminacy.
?
Even if countries have low educational efficiency, which are assumed to be
developing or underdeveloped economies, they have the capability of positive
growth if there have high intertemporal substitution elasticity and slight
educational externality; however, the dynamical properties related to positive
growth are indeterminant, and thus, the realization of positive growth is faced
with difficulties arising from expectation formation.
5 Concluding Remark
This study extended the standard Uzawa–Lucas model by adding education
efficiency that is endogenously determined to examine its dynamic properties.
The main results are as follows. If an economy’s intertemporal substitution
elasticity is larger than 1, and the economy has a sufficiently small but non 0
externality, the economy can have multiple steady states. However, the pos-
itive steady growth for economies with lower educational efficiency (case of
developing economies) or those with higher steady growth and educational ef-
ficiency (case of advanced economies) is related to indeterminacy. Therefore,
the realization of positive or higher growth is subject to expectation forma-
tion under indeterminacy. Thus, when considering an economic shock, future
theoretical agenda should consider introducing and inquiring the factors that
are lack in the present study, namely, monetary factors, unemployment and
expectation formation structures.
Furthermore, intertemporal substitution elasticity being larger than 1
is the key factor determining multiplicity in the present study. Thus, any
future agenda should include empirical studies on intertemporal substitution
elasticity from the viewpoint of multiplicity.
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Table 2: Equilibrium Set
θ Case I (b¯ > ρ˜) Case II (b¯ < ρ˜)
θ < 1 {E1, E2} {E0, E2}
θ > 1 {E1} {E0}
6 Appendix
6.1 The dynamical prooeties of the Case III
We check the property for the case with ε > 1−α (Case III). In this case, the
function Φ becomes decreasing, so multiple steady states does not emerge.
The pattern of steady states is determined by only the condition derived in
Lemma1-1 The obtained relsut is given in Tab.2 in the colum of ε > 1 − α.
E3 denotes the equilibrium with positive human capital accumulation in the
Case III.
Under this restriction, the sign of Θ yields the following condition:
u∗3
{
<
>
}
u⇔
{
saddle stable
source or indeterminacy
. (27)
Since β < 0 in this case, if θ > 1, then u < 0, so u∗3 > 0 > u always holds.
Furthermore, if θ < 1, then L(u) < 0 holds, so that u∗3 > u is necessary
for L(u∗3) > 0. Thus, we always have u3 > 0 > u, so we have the following
lemma:
Lemma III The system always has Det∗ > 0
However, the sign of −B + Det
Tr
is ambigous. So, the dynamical properties
in this case is difficult to be settled, and hence, we have a simplifying as-
sumption, which gives us an analytical solution and the definite properties
of the model.
Assumption for simplicity For simplicity, we assume ε = 1.
It should be noted that the Lemma III holds on this specification, and
from Fig.3, the steady state is unique; there is endogenous growth if xφ < xψ
and no growth if xφ < xψ. Under this assumption, υ(x, p˜) is transformed
into υ˜(p˜) := (1− α) b¯
p˜
; namely, the variable x does not affects υ(x, p˜), which
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makes the analysis easier. Furthermore, this solution is possible not because
ε = 1 is a singular point but because the neighborhood of ε has the same
dynamical properties, as shown in the latter.
Under the assumption ε = 1, uniting (24) and (23) provides
˙˜p(t)
p˜(t)
= −1− α
α
r(p˜(t))
(
1 +
b¯
p˜(t)
)
+ q(t). (24’)
Thus, the system comprises (22), (23), and (24’), and the linearized dynam-
ical equations { ˙˜p, q˙, x˙} are obtained as follows: ˙˜p(t)q˙(t)
x˙(t)
 =
 Rˆˆ¯b1p˜∗ p˜∗ 0(1− αθ ) q∗Rˆ q∗ 0
−Rˆx∗(ˆ¯b1 + α) −x∗ b¯x∗−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=J∗1
 p˜(t)− p˜∗q(t)− q∗
x(t)− x∗
 , (28)
where Rˆ := 1−α
α2
r∗
p˜∗ > 0 and
ˆ¯b1 := 1 − α + b¯p˜∗ > 0. Thus, we have the
determinant and the trace of the present study as follows:
Det∗1 =
q∗b¯x∗−1
θ
RˆΘ1, and Tr
∗
1 = Rˆ
ˆ¯b1p˜
∗ + q∗ + b¯x∗−1 > 0, (29)
where Θ1 := θb¯+(1−θ)αp˜∗. It should be noted that the sign of Θ is positive
from Lemma III. Thus, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition III On the neighborhood of ε, the system is always unstable.
Proof) Under the combination of Det∗1 > 0 and Tr
∗
1 > 0, local indetermi-
nacy or divergence is determined by the sign of −B∗1 + Det
∗
1
Tr∗1
:
−B∗1 +
Det∗1
Tr∗1
{
<
>
}
0⇐⇒
{
unstable(divergence)
indeterminacy
, (30)
where B∗1 is defined as follows:
B∗1 :=
∣∣∣∣∣ Rˆˆ¯b1p˜∗ 0−Rˆx∗(ˆ¯b1 + α) b¯x−1∗
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ Rˆˆ¯b1p˜∗ p˜∗(1− α
θ
)
q∗Rˆ q∗
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣ q∗ 0−x∗ b¯x∗−1
∣∣∣∣
= Rˆ
q∗
θ
Θ+ q∗b¯x∗−1 + Rˆb¯x∗−1ˆ¯b1p˜∗. (31)
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In Eq. (31), the only variable that can possibly take a negative value is Θ,
but now, when we consider the case of Θ > 0, all variables constituting B∗1
are positive. Using Eqs. (29) and (31), we can calculate
−B∗1 +
Det∗1
Tr∗1
= − Rˆ
q
θ
Θ(Rˆˆ¯b1p˜
∗ + q∗)
Rˆˆ¯b1p˜∗ + q∗ + b¯x∗−1
− (q∗b¯x∗−1 + Rˆb¯x∗−1ˆ¯b1p˜∗) < 0.
Thus, the system is always unstable. Furthermore, by definig ε = 1 + ε′, we
can show that the result also holds under sufficiently small ε′. (Q.E.D.)
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